

# Modelling Epistemic Uncertainty in Common-Cause Failure Models with Sets of Conjugate Priors

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19 March 2013

# Outline


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## Common-Cause Failures



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# Common-Cause Failures



Source: <http://www.diakont.com/solutions/nuclear-energy/plant-systems/diesel-generator-control-systems/>

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## Common-Cause Failures

- All 12 generators (for 6 reactors) at Fukushima Daiichi were not available due to flooding of machine rooms (Tsunami caused by Tōhoku earthquake)

### common-cause failure

*simultaneous failure of several redundant components due to a common or shared root cause [3]*

- Reliability of redundant systems
- Usually 2 – 4 emergency diesel generators per reactor
- Sufficient cooling of core if one generator works
- Redundant components may not fail independently:  
common-cause failure

**Must include common-cause failures  
in overall system reliability analysis**


# Common-Cause Failure Modelling



Above: CDC, <http://phil.cdc.gov/phil/ID1194>

Right: Wikimedia Commons,

[http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Graphic\\_TMI-2\\_Core\\_End-State\\_Configuration.png](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Graphic_TMI-2_Core_End-State_Configuration.png)



# Basic Parameter Model: Definition

## Definition (Basic Parameter Model [5])

- immediate repair
- failures follow Poisson process
- system with  $k$  exchangeable components
- $q_j$ : rate for failures involving *exact*  $j$  components ( $j = 1, \dots, k$ )
- $(q_1, \dots, q_k) =: \mathbf{q}$

$q_j \neq 0$  for  $j \geq 2$ : lack of independence for individual component failures

$\mathbf{q}$  is difficult to estimate directly:

- failure data often collected per component
- sparse data on joint failures

# Alpha-Factor Model

## Definition (Total Failure Rate)

$$q_t = \sum_{j=1}^k \binom{k-1}{j-1} q_j. \quad (1)$$

*total or marginal failure rate:*  
failure rate obtained by looking  
just at single components

## Definition (Alpha-Factors)

$$\alpha_j = \frac{\binom{k}{j} q_j}{\sum_{\ell=1}^k \binom{k}{\ell} q_\ell}. \quad (2)$$

probability of  $j$  of the  $k$  components  
failing due to a common cause  
given that failure occurs

$$q_j = \frac{1}{\binom{k-1}{j-1}} \frac{j \alpha_j}{\sum_{\ell=1}^k \ell \alpha_\ell} q_t. \quad (3)$$

$$(\mathbf{q}) \iff (q_t, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k)$$

## Data

observed per-component  
failure rates to estimate  $q_t$

## Data

common-cause failure counts  
to estimate  $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k)$

# Total Failure Rate: Data Model & Parameter Estimation

## Poisson Process for Observed Per-Component Failures

$$\Pr(M|q_t, T) = \frac{(q_t T)^M e^{-q_t T}}{M!} \quad (4)$$

where

- **total failure rate**  $q_t$
- **number of per-component (i.e. marginal) failures**  $M$  := total number of component failures occurred (two-component failure = two failures, ...)
- **time under risk**  $T$  := sum of time elapsed for each of the components

## The Good News

can estimate  $q_t$  directly from data, e.g. MLE:

$$\hat{q}_t = \frac{M}{T} \quad (5)$$

# Alpha-Factors: Data Model

## Multinomial Distribution for Common-Cause Failure Counts

$$\Pr(\mathbf{n}|\boldsymbol{\alpha}) = \prod_{j=1}^k \alpha_j^{n_j} \quad (6)$$

where

- **alpha-factor**  $\alpha_j$  := probability of  $j$  of the  $k$  components failing due to a common cause given that failure occurs
- **failure count**  $n_j$  := corresponding number of failures observed
- $\mathbf{n}$  denotes  $(n_1, \dots, n_k)$  and  $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$  denotes  $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k)$

# Alpha-Factors: Parameter Estimation

## The Good News

can estimate  $\alpha$  directly from data, e.g. MLE:

$$\hat{\alpha}_j = \frac{n_j}{\sum_{j=1}^n n_j} \quad (7)$$

## The Bad News

- typically, for  $j \geq 2$ , the  $n_j$  are very low with zero being quite common for larger  $j$
- zero counts = flat likelihoods  
standard techniques such as MLE can struggle to produce sensible inferences for  $\alpha$

⇒ need to rely on **epistemic information**

# Dirichlet Prior

$\alpha$  considered as uncertain parameter on which we put. . .

## Definition (Dirichlet Distribution)

$$f(\alpha | \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) \propto \prod_{j=1}^k \alpha_j^{s t_j - 1} \quad (8)$$

where  $(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$  are hyperparameters

$$\mathbf{s} > 0 \quad \mathbf{t} \in \Delta = \left\{ (t_1, \dots, t_k) : t_1 \geq 0, \dots, t_k \geq 0, \sum_{j=1}^k t_j = 1 \right\} \quad (9)$$

## Interpretation

- $\mathbf{t}$  = prior expectation of  $\alpha$
- $s$  = determines learning speed (see next slide)

## Dirichlet Posterior

- posterior density for  $\alpha$  is again Dirichlet

$$f(\alpha|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) \propto \prod_{j=1}^k \alpha_j^{st_j+n_j-1}. \quad (10)$$

- posterior expectation of  $\alpha_j$

$$E(\alpha_j|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = \int_{\Delta} \alpha_j f(\alpha|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) d\alpha = \frac{N}{N+s} \frac{n_j}{N} + \frac{s}{N+s} t_j \quad (11)$$

where  $N = \sum_{j=1}^k n_j$  is total number of observations

**we shall focus on  $E(\alpha_j|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$**

(in a decision context, this expectation would typically end up in expressions for expected utility)

## Example

(taken from [4])

### Example

Consider a system with four redundant components ( $k = 4$ ).

The analyst specifies the following prior expectation  $\mu_{\text{spec},j}$  for each  $\alpha_j$ :

$$\mu_{\text{spec},1} = 0.950 \quad \mu_{\text{spec},2} = 0.030 \quad \mu_{\text{spec},3} = 0.015 \quad \mu_{\text{spec},4} = 0.005 \quad (12)$$

We have 36 observations, in which 35 showed one component failing, and 1 showed two components failing:

$$n_1 = 35 \quad n_2 = 1 \quad n_3 = 0 \quad n_4 = 0 \quad (13)$$

## Non-Informative Priors

### large variation in posterior under different non-informative priors

- with constrained maximum entropy prior (Kelly and Atwood [1, 4]):

$$E(\alpha_1|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.967$$

$$E(\alpha_2|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.028$$

$$E(\alpha_3|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.003$$

$$E(\alpha_4|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.001$$

- with uniform prior  $t_j = 0.25$  and  $s = 4$ :

$$E(\alpha_1|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.9$$

$$E(\alpha_2|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.05$$

$$E(\alpha_3|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.025$$

$$E(\alpha_4|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.025$$

- with Jeffrey's prior  $t_j = 0.25$  and  $s = 2$ :

$$E(\alpha_1|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.9342$$

$$E(\alpha_2|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.0395$$

$$E(\alpha_3|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.0132$$

$$E(\alpha_4|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) = 0.0132$$

## Imprecise Dirichlet Model: Definition

- use a **set of hyperparameters** [7, 8]

$$\mathcal{H} = \{(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}): \mathbf{s} \in [\underline{\mathbf{s}}, \overline{\mathbf{s}}], \mathbf{t} \in \Delta, t_j \in [\underline{t}_j, \overline{t}_j]\} \quad (14)$$

over which we do a **sensitivity analysis** (à la robust Bayes)

- analyst has to specify  
bounds  $[\underline{t}_j, \overline{t}_j]$  for each  $j \in \{1, \dots, k\}$ ,  
bounds  $[\underline{\mathbf{s}}, \overline{\mathbf{s}}]$

## Imprecise Dirichlet Model: Elicitation

- $[\underline{t}_j, \bar{t}_j]$ ? cautious interpretation of prior specifications  $\mu_{\text{spec},j}$ :

$$[\underline{t}_1, \bar{t}_1] = [0.950, 1]$$

$$[\underline{t}_2, \bar{t}_2] = [0, 0.030]$$

$$[\underline{t}_3, \bar{t}_3] = [0, 0.015]$$

$$[\underline{t}_4, \bar{t}_4] = [0, 0.005]$$

- $[\underline{s}, \bar{s}]$ ? Good [2]:

reason about posterior expectations of hypothetical data

$\bar{s}$  = number of one-component failures required

to reduce the upper probabilities of multi-components failure by half

$\underline{s}$  = number of multi-component failures required

to reduce the lower probability of one-component failure by half

## Imprecise Dirichlet Model: Elicitation

reasonable values:

- $\underline{s} = 1$ :  
immediate multi-component failure  
 $\implies$  keen to reduce lower probability for one-component failure
- $\bar{s} = 10$ :  
after observing 10 one-component failures  
 $\implies$  halve upper probabilities of multi-component failures

there is a **difference between  $\bar{s}$  and  $\underline{s}$**   
as the rate at which we reduce upper probabilities  
is less than the rate at which we reduce lower probabilities  
 $\implies$  reflects a **level of caution**

# Imprecise Dirichlet Model: Inference

prior bounds + likelihood  $\rightarrow$  posterior bounds

- with  $t_j = \mu_{\text{spec},j}$ :

$j$	$\underline{E}(\alpha_j \mathbf{n}, \mathcal{H})$	$\overline{E}(\alpha_j \mathbf{n}, \mathcal{H})$
1	0.967	0.972
2	0.0278	0.0283
3	0.00041	0.00326
4	0.00014	0.00109

- with bounds as earlier:

$j$	$\underline{E}(\alpha_j \mathbf{n}, \mathcal{H})$	$\overline{E}(\alpha_j \mathbf{n}, \mathcal{H})$
1	0.967	0.978
2	0.0270	0.0283
3	0	0.00326
4	0	0.00109

# Gamma Prior and Posterior

$q_t$  considered as uncertain parameter on which we put. . .

## Definition (Gamma Distribution)

$$f(q_t|u, v) \propto q_t^{uv-1} e^{-q_t u} \quad (15)$$

where  $(u, v)$  are hyperparameters with  $u > 0$  and  $v > 0$ .

## Interpretation

- $v$  = **prior expectation of  $q_t$**
- $u$  = determines **learning speed** (just like  $s$  in the IDM)

- posterior density for  $q_t$  is again Gamma

$$f(q_t|M, T, u, v) \propto q_t^{uv+M-1} e^{-q_t(u+T)}. \quad (16)$$

- posterior expectation of  $q_t$

$$E(q_t|M, T, u, v) = \frac{T}{T+u} \frac{M}{T} + \frac{u}{T+u} v \quad (17)$$

## Imprecise Gamma Model

use a **set of hyperparameters**:

$$\mathcal{J} = \left\{ (u, v) : u \in [\underline{u}, \bar{u}], v \in [\underline{v}, \bar{v}] \right\} \quad (18)$$

- $[\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$ ? Bounds for prior expectation of  $q_t$  should be easy to find (choosing  $\underline{v} = 0$  is possible)
- $[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]$ ? Similar reasoning as for the IDM leads to...

$\bar{u}$  = timespan for observing the process required to raise the lower expectation of  $q_t$  from 0 to half of observed failure rate  $\frac{M}{T}$  ( $\underline{v} = 0$  is assumed)

$\underline{u}$  = timespan for observing the process *without any failures* required to reduce the lower expectation of  $q_t$  by half ( $\underline{v} > 0$  is assumed)

$\underline{u} = \bar{u}$  can be reasonable here, as zero counts are less of an issue

## Inference on Common-Cause Failure Rates $q_j$

combine our models for  $\alpha$  and  $q_t$  by using Eq. (3):

$$q_j = g_j(\alpha)q_t \quad \text{where} \quad g_j(\alpha) = \frac{1}{\binom{k-1}{j-1}} \frac{j\alpha_j}{\sum_{\ell=1}^k \ell\alpha_\ell}$$

### The Bad News

no closed expression for  $E(g_j(\alpha)|\dots)$  due to rational function of  $\alpha$

### The Good News

naive approximation  $\tilde{g}_j(\alpha)$  of  $g_j(\alpha)$  by Taylor expansion works surprisingly well (absolute error term available)

$$E(q_j|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}; M, T, u, v) \approx E(\tilde{g}_j(\alpha)|\mathbf{n}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) E(q_t|M, T, u, v) \quad (19)$$

( $q_t$  and  $\alpha$  are assumed to be independent)

# Global Sensitivity Analysis

We can do a **global sensitivity analysis** for  $E(q_j | \dots)$

$\implies$  bounds for  $E(q_j | \dots)$  taking into account approximation error and *epistemic uncertainty expressed through  $\mathcal{H}$  and  $\mathcal{J}$* :

$$\underline{E}(q_j | \mathbf{n}, M, T, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{J}) \approx \underline{E}(\tilde{g}_j(\alpha) | \mathbf{n}, \mathcal{H}) \underline{E}(q_t | M, T, \mathcal{J}) \quad (20)$$

where

$$\underline{E}(\tilde{g}_j(\alpha) | \mathbf{n}, \mathcal{H}) = \min_{(s, \mathbf{t}) \in \mathcal{H}} E(\tilde{g}_j(\alpha) | \mathbf{n}, s, \mathbf{t}) \quad (\text{by num. optimization}) \quad (21)$$

$$\underline{E}(q_t | M, T, \mathcal{J}) = \min_{(u, v) \in \mathcal{J}} E(q_t | M, T, u, v) \quad (\text{by closed form solution}) \quad (22)$$

Do the same for  $\overline{E}(q_j | \mathbf{n}, M, T, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{J})$  by replacing min with max

# Conclusion

main messages:

- **bounds**, rather than precise values, are desirable due to inferences being strongly sensitive to the prior particularly when faced with zero counts.
- simple ways to elicit the parameters of the model by **reasoning on hypothetical data** rather than by maximum entropy arguments
- sets of hyperparameters allow a full **sensitivity analysis** reflecting epistemic uncertainty of the analyst on all levels of the model

stingy questions:

- hyperparameter sets have very specific form, do they fit to the epistemic information at hand? (other set shapes are currently investigated)
- can use of variance obliterate use of bounds on expectations? (operational interpretation of variance of an unknown parameter versus direct bounds on expectation of unknown parameter) (credible intervals do not save the example discussed)

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